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except "sensationalist" morality is to be sustained, this seems to be a dangerous identification. If nothing happens except according to natural law, and if natural law is the law of God, it is hard to escape from the conclusion, that whatever is (or has been, or shall be) is right. We need not dwell upon this. Such, however, is the Duke's philosophy, in ethics as in teleology, that at every seeming advance we are plunged deeper and deeper into mystery. We are led through a cloud of metaphysics by a guide who believes himself and his followers to be—at least most of the time—walking in the clear light of reason.

But it would be unjust to close without referring to another aspect of this work, which makes it in our opinion not only interesting but valuable. Though the author does not seem to be fully aware how deep and how widely diffused are the sources of the scepticism which he endeavors to counteract; and though, as a consequence, many of his arguments are pointless, superficial, and useless for their purpose, no reader can help being struck with the wealth of information—scientific rather than philosophical—which the work contains. A note of impatience is here and there discernible in it; an intolerance of opposition, and a seeming inability to recognize the fact that such opposition is sincere,—not to say well-founded. The Duke's own belief is so strong that to him unbelief seems incredible. He would have other men employ his own glasses. All that ardor and eloquence can do is done by him to persuade them. His zeal is admirable. As one reads, one feels somehow the better for the buoyancy and strength of the writer's spirit. Indeed, "The Philosophy of Belief"—we say it with modest confidence—could only be the work of a strong as well as a good man. What the special theologians, for whom it seems to have been chiefly intended, may think of it, we cannot venture to predict. But its tone will cheer and inspire many readers whom its arguments may fail to convince.

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FRANCESCO D'ASSISI E ALCUNI DEI SUOI RECENTI BIOGRAFI. Memoria letta all' Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche della Società Reale di Napoli, dal Socio Raffaele Mariano. Napoli: Tipografia della Regia Università, 1896. 8vo. Pp. 208.

The interest attaching to this work is due not so much to the manner in which its subject is treated or the results arrived at, as

to the point of view from which it is written. The author's aim is not so much to elicit truth as to defend a thesis. Though several biographies are dealt with,—three, those of Bonghi, Sabatier, and Thode, at considerable length,—the work is, in reality, an attack upon Sabatier, an attack which is made to seem less individual by being distributed among several persons. "For Sabatier's volume were reserved the power and the good fortune to wake us up." (p. 33.) At the same time, the attack is directed less against Sabatier and his book than against the ethical and political tendency which they represent. Mariano and Sabatier—so, at least, the former thinks—stand for two opposite tendencies in thought and practice. Yielding to the desire for antiquities to give prestige to his views, Sabatier has claimed St. Francis as an ancient apostle of his gospel. Mariano, possessed by the same desire, and recognizing the value of such imposing prestige, jealously disputes the other's right to it, and claims the saint for his own gospel. Such is the purpose of the present volume. In order to understand the full bearing of the controversy, we must try to define, in general terms, the two gospels.

Hegel, whose right to speak Professor Mariano will acknowledge, once said: "Human history is a progress in the consciousness of freedom." This progress has two stages, not altogether successive,—progress in freedom from nature, and progress in freedom from institutions. Such freedom by no means implies that either nature or institutions are discredited or rendered superfluous, but merely that man has come to assume to them an attitude of mastership, and no longer one of thralldom. Through institutions man freed himself from nature; and he is now gradually freeing himself from institutions, by coming to see that they are the embodiment of his own rationality, and doing his best to make them an ever worthier embodiment of the same. In this way he rises above both natural and human laws, and, in the plenitude of moral freedom, becomes a law to himself. What we call modern, as distinguished from ancient and mediæval civilization, is mainly the result of the latter process—the liberation from institutions. In the Middle Age, institutions ruled everything. Church and State, both regarded as of superhuman origin, together claimed man's whole nature and the right to regulate his entire activity. His salvation, here and hereafter, depended upon his having no knowledge, no affection, no will, but such as these approved. There was a time, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when it seemed as if the whole civilized world

were going to stop short at this condition of things; and, indeed, one portion of it, the Moslem world, did stop there, and has stopped there ever since, with what results we see. But, thanks largely to the energy of the northern peoples, the Christian world, in part at least, was saved from this fate. Since the days of Abelard, there has been in Christendom a distinct upward movement, slowly but surely disintegrating the institutions based on superhuman authority, and, in defiance of all opposition, brutal or bland, in defiance of axe and stake and gibbet, in defiance of thousand-fold massacre and myriad-fold martyrdom, making way for the kindly authority of human reason and human science. For many centuries this movement pursued its way unconscious of itself, its noblest bearers, Abelard, Francis, Eckhard, Bruno, Campanella, and the rest, groping in the dark and often going astray. Indeed, it was only about the middle of the last century that it reached self-consciousness, which then flashed upon the world like an electric spark upon stores of powder. Detonation followed detonation in rapid succession,—the writings of Rousseau, Voltaire, and the encyclopædists, the poetry of Goethe, the philosophy of Kant, the American War of Liberation, the French Revolution,—all contributing to rend to pieces the structure of superhumanism. Unfortunately, the last of these, in which a whole magazine of suppressed energy exploded, proved so destructive as to cause, in Europe, a reaction in favor of superhumanism and enslaving institutionalism, which has set the world back for well-nigh a century. Monarchies by the grace of God have been set up anew, and are trying to reintroduce their old despotism,—witness Russia, Austria, and Germany; supernatural religion, despite all the revelations of philosophy, science, history, and criticism, is struggling, by fair means and foul, to prolong its immoral and doomed existence. And to justify all this, and throw humanity back into the arms of superstition, there arose a philosophy which, while professing to be the very process of reason itself, was in reality based upon a denial of its very first principle, as, indeed, was necessary, if it was to perform its function. This philosophy—Hegelianism—by a fictitious and arbitrary construction of logic and history, and a disingenuous distortion of the meaning of Christian conceptions and dogmas, sought to show that man is merely the creature of an institutional process of which ecclesiastical Christianity and military despotism are the final consummation. This system was, of course, hailed with acclamation by all the reactionaries in Church and State, and

declared by a prominent Christian divine, over the coffin of its author, to be the message of the Paraclete ! As such, it demoralized Germany for half a century, and, even when the good sense of the Germans at last utterly rejected it, as it did long ago, and forced it to seek refuge among the timid reactionaries of Italy, England, and America, it left them shorn of their enthusiasm for freedom, and ready to fall, politically, under the yoke of Bismarckian dictatorship, or even of that aggravated form of feudalism styled socialism, which is merely Hegelianism in politics ; and, philosophically, into a crude empiricism, which is little more than a botanizing on the grave of philosophy. “ *Die Deutschen wollen regiert sein,*” said the rector of a German university to me on one occasion recently ; on another, “ *Die Philosophie in Deutschland ist todt.*” Outside of Germany, this pseudo-rational, reactionary system has gone far to paralyze the spirit of liberty in many of those very men who, by their education and intelligence, ought to have been the emancipators of their countrymen, and to induce a deadening belief that the march of civilization is due to a super-human mechanical force, a self-unwinding idea, that weaves itself, as warp and woof, into all that is or ever will be.

Within the last few years, however, there have been encouraging signs that this sad reaction in favor of authority and supernaturalism is coming to a close, and that the spirit of liberty which came to grief in France, through its youthful excesses, a hundred years ago, has learnt wisdom and caution from bitter experience, and is again abroad, reproving the wide-spread moral despair (in which even poor Renan ended his days) and calling men to that consciousness of their essential freedom and dignity which is the prime condition of all progress. So far, indeed, this spirit has not been able to muster its forces in such a way as to offer effective battle to the leaden-armed legions of reaction, and, therefore, much of its effort is wasted in sweet sentimentality of a neo-Christian sort, or in mere negation, smacking of Voltaire ; but no one can read such a work as M. Henry Martin’s “ *L’Idée de l’État*” without feeling that this state of things cannot last long, and that, at no distant date, the same spirit which, in blind fury destroyed the Bastille and glutted the guillotine, will, in calm self-possession and with kindly yet firm hand, overthrow every structure implying that man has to look anywhere else for intellectual or moral guidance than to his own spiritual nature, his own reason and conscience.

We can now, in a few words, distinguish the two spirits that

divide and rule the civilized world of to-day. The one, the spirit of reaction, seeks to subordinate the individual to institutions, conceived as of superhuman or even of supernatural origin, trying to persuade him that the means of his salvation lie outside of himself, in the form of divine grace embodied in these; that, in the process of evolution, he is the clay and not the potter. The other, the spirit of progress, seeks to raise the individual to perfect freedom, by showing him that, as spirit and person, he is at once necessarily particular and universal, and therefore the creator of all institutions, these being simply so many expressions of the relations of his particularity to his universality,—in a word, that “Man is man, and master of his fate,” or, as Hierocles puts it, “Man must first be man and then god.” Briefly, the spirit of reaction is the spirit of superstition, the spirit of progress the spirit of truth. Between these there is incessant warfare, enlisting not only individuals, but also nations, on either side. Russia, Austria, Turkey, and the whole of Islâm are on the side of reaction, and imperial Germany seems to lean in the same direction; England and civic Italy seem preparing to follow progress. France, amid many disheartening impediments, is following it. America, from the hour of its independence, was principally and irrevocably committed to it.

Returning now to Professor Mariano's book, we may say that its chief interest consists in this, that it is mainly a criticism by a reactionary of the Hegelian sort on the work of a man inclined to follow the spirit of progress. The author's chief objection to M. Sabatier's book is that, instead of supporting ecclesiasticism, dogma, tradition, authority, supernaturalism, and superstition, it advocates what he is pleased to call “individualism” and “superstition” (not to speak of harder names! see pp. 102, 174, etc.), but what is really freedom of thought and conscience; and that it claims St. Francis, an Italian, as an early champion of the same. Professor Mariano is the ardent defender of dogma and authority, the sworn foe of free thought and conscience. That this is no exaggerated statement will be apparent from the following quotations, which will show the tone and temper of the book: “If we could, with any show of likelihood, make room for the supposition that the day would come when man should cease to concentrate his feelings and thoughts upon God, and should succeed in completely uprooting from his bosom the need and, in some degree at least, the vision of the absolute principle of the universe, nothing and no one could, in the long run, escape the fatal destiny of fall-

ing back into a state of barbarism and animality all the more violent and savage than that of primitive times, because more corrupt"* (p. 40). The new religious wisdom of Ritschl, Harnack, etc., "teaches that the essence of Christianity consists in love to God and brotherly love among men, forgetting, and leaving too much out of sight, the concrete theological truths of faith, not created by theologians, but revealed by Christ, which form the necessary foundation and inner vital sap of brotherliness and love (p. 52 *sq.*). Sabatier says, 'The Reformation could do nothing else but substitute the authority of the Bible for that of the priest, —a mere change of dynasty, that was all.'† And he adds that, in accordance with the spirit of our times, all authority must lie within and not without the conscience, and consist in universal priesthood.‡ Thus he would make out that the shortcoming of the Reformation, and therefore its inanity, were due to its not having asserted the absolute right of the individual conscience,—in other words, to its not having destroyed every principle of authority, and so opened the way for the destruction of every determinate and objective truth of Christian faith. For one who but yesterday had the care of souls, such fiery championship of the reckless spirit of modern times does not produce an altogether

* It is interesting, as an item in comparative culture, to place beside this the words recently uttered by Rev. Dr. Marshall Lang before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland: "I decline to measure religious life by any outside test. There is a religion without Christ, without God even, strange as it may sound. There is no feature of the present day more to be pondered than this, that we have men, and of these not a few, who are representing some of the highest features and elements of religion, who are yet unchristian and agnostic even. They show a devotion to duty, a capacity of sacrifice, a connection of life with high aims and objects that may well rebuke them who know Christ and live with God in this world."—*Glasgow Herald*, May 26, 1896, p. 9.

† It may be worth while to add here the context of this quotation, as showing how completely gratuitous is Professor Mariano's charge of "subjectivism" laid at M. Sabatier's door: "As to the majority of those who at present call themselves free-thinkers, they confound religious emancipation with irreligion: they will not see that in religion, as in politics, there is room between kingship by divine right and anarchy for a government which may be as strong as the first and guarantee liberty better than the second. The ancient mind placed God outside the world, sovereignty outside the peoples, authority outside the conscience; the spirit of modern times has the opposite tendency: it denies neither God, nor sovereignty, nor authority, but it sees them where they really are." ("Vie de S. François d'Assisi," p. v.)

‡ Sabatier does not say this; but if he had, *cf.* Exodus xix. 6.

agreeable impression" * (p. 54 *sq.*). "Francis is placed too high, whereas Christ is dragged down from his divine throne. Francis is imagined as a second Christ, whereas, if we take into consideration the person of Christ and his mission of revelation, it is evident that there never has been, and never can be, another to place beside him. On the other hand, Christ is made a simple archetype which Francis imitates and reproduces, whereas, if we take account of the inmost thought that animates the two, it is no less evident that, in what Christ was, the revealer and creator of a new relation between the divine and the human, Francis cannot, even remotely, be compared with him. But, I repeat, there is no reason to be astonished at these strange excesses, intended to bring Christ down to a purely human level and rob his nature of every super-human characteristic. They spring, as necessary consequences, from Sabatier's peculiar conception of religion" (p. 57 *sq.*). "Sabatier makes this new life [initiated by St. Francis] consist in the right to the most absolute moral subjectivism, in an assertion of the individual's right to the most complete liberty of thought and conscience. And we go from bad to worse when we pass from Sabatier to Thode" (p. 63). "Francis, drawing, indeed, his inspiration from Christ, but not being, like him, a Son of God, was still able to show men how to overcome the woes of existence" (p. 77). "As for theology . . . he asserts that it has killed religion. Hence for him, the profound expression, *fides querens intellectum*, becomes foolishness. And godliness (*religiosità*) and religious faith are, as a consequence, a mere moral idealism . . . without any intermixture of thought, intent upon scrutinizing and fathoming divine truth" † (p. 100). "There never dawns for an

* Since Professor Mariano alludes to this more than once, and even goes so far as to quote, from a private letter of Sabatier's (p. 34), words plainly intended to fix upon him the stigma of vanity, it may not be amiss to quote here a few words from Lessing: "All blame, all ridicule which the critic, with the book under consideration in his hand, can make good is permitted to the critic. . . . But as soon as the critic betrays that he knows more of his author than his writings can tell him, as soon as he uses against him the slightest unfavorable touch drawn from this closer knowledge, so soon his blame becomes personal insult. He ceases to be a critic, and becomes—the most contemptible thing that a rational being can become—a gossip, a slanderer, a lampooner." ("Briefe antiq. Inhalts," No. 75.)

† To see what an utter misrepresentation and caricature of Sabatier's thought this is, compare second foot-note on page 247. Surely, divine truth does not cease to be knowable because it is the form of the human spirit.

instant upon Sabatier a suspicion that faith in the miraculous (*prodigioso*) may, peradventure, be an immanent and inalienable need of the religious sentiment. And yet he speaks of it as if it were something altogether false, frightfully corrupting, and baneful" (p. 100 *sq.*). "These outrageous (*strampalate*) manifestations, however, reach a climax when religious systems are classified into two families,—religions which turn their eye to divinity, and whose activity resolves itself into worship and sacrifice, and religions which turn their eye upon man, and direct the whole of their efforts upon the heart and conscience, in order to transform them. Just as if there were any other way of transforming the heart and conscience than by keeping the eye fixed on divinity!" (p. 102 *sq.*). "It is not permitted to speak of Christian truth that is not impressed with the Church's seal. If there was a heaven, an influence of Christianity, it was transmitted solely through the Church" * (p. 109).

I have made these quotations somewhat extensive, because they bring out better than any words of mine could (1) the attitude of Professor Mariano, and, in general, of the whole reactionary school, (2) the nature of the movement which they antagonize and try to discredit,—the movement towards freedom of thought and conscience,—and (3) the importance of M. Sabatier's book, as an earnest contribution towards this movement. One thing we may safely say, and that is, that Professor Mariano, by his bigoted and ungenerous criticism of that work, has done much to recommend it to all liberal-minded men; and for that he ought to be heartily thanked.

Seeing with what assurance Professor Mariano draws a hard and fast line between Christ as a "Son of God" and St. Francis as something quite different (see above, p. 248), we might suppose that he had good reason for distinguishing between the divine and the human. What, then, is our surprise to find him saying: "It appears to me certain that, properly understood, Pantheism is somehow the ultimate basis of all true philosophy, and, what is more to the purpose, of all religion, notably of Christianity. St. Paul, for

* Compare with this what Dante wrote nearly six hundred years ago:

"But, lo! many there be that cry, Christ! Christ!
Who, in the judgment, shall be very far
Less near to him than some that know not Christ."

—*Parad.* xix. 106 *sq.*

example, when he exclaims: 'In him we live, and move, and are' (Acts xvii. 28), and again, 'Of him, and through, and unto him, are all things' (Rom. xi. 36), is as much a Pantheist as Hegel" (p. 42 n.)! This may or may not be true; but if it is, where is the distinction between the divine and the human? It is to be feared, moreover, that this is a Christian truth not "impressed with the Church's seal;" for certainly every important section of the Church repudiates it with indignation, above all the Roman. It is yet further to be feared that, in this instance, Professor Mariano, in spite of all bitter polemic against the individualism and subjectivism of M. Sabatier, has allowed himself to be guilty of a most heinous individual and subjective opinion, a "fantasticaggine radicaleggiante" (p. 174), to use his own phrase. The truth is, like all Hegelian reactionaries, he is nothing, if not individualistic and subjective, and this he even admits on one occasion. Speaking of the work of a writer, who, as the result of an inquiry admitted to be careful and exhaustive, has come to the conclusion that St. Francis's "Song of the Sun" is to be regarded as of doubtful authenticity, he says: "Now, if I must candidly speak my mind, notwithstanding the Herculean efforts he puts forth to demonstrate his thesis, and all the truly *Franciscan patience* which he evinces, I would willingly hand over to criticism all caution and prudence; and, even at the risk of passing, in its eyes, for an example of imprudence and rashness, or, worse yet, for a fool, I should prefer to go on believing that the author of the 'Song of the Sun' in the vernacular, was really St. Francis" (p. 177 n.). If this is not subjectivism, one wonders what is. In sober truth, the whole book is about as good a specimen of subjective writing as one could wish to see. It adds nothing to science or sound objective criticism.

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THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. By T. J. Lawrence, M.A., LL.D. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895. Pp. xxi., 645.

The author of this work himself bears a somewhat international character. He is now "Rector of Girton and Lecturer in Downing College, Cambridge, England;" he was "lately University Extension Professor of History and International Law in the University of Chicago," and was "sometime Deputy Professor of International